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Abstract 
In the presence of international public goods, donors are faced with two instruments whereby recipient 
utility may be altered - contributions towards the international public good and direct transfers 
(conventional foreign aid). The self-interested donor's optimal choice of transfer-contributions 
combinations will typically depend upon the public goods technology. Some technologies call for a corner 
solution, with either transfers or contributions set to zero, and others are characterised by interior 
solutions, where the donor's optimal strategy calls for a positive transfers and positive contributions. 
Whether or not the presence of an international public good strengthens the case for conventional foreign 
liid transfers is therefore not always obvious. 
-

... 
*We are grateful to Todd Sandler and to seminar participants at Cornell University, UNDP and the 
Overseas Development Council for helpful comments. The work on this paper is part of a larger project at 
the Overseas Development Council on the Future of Multilateral Assistance. 
1. Introduction 
Public discourse and debate on foreign aid, defmed as official flows of resources to developing countries, 
has undergone an interesting transformation since the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the cold war. 
Twenty years ago, the rationale for foreign aid was seen either in terms of security or solidarity. On the one hand, 
official flows served to keep countries in one of the two main global blocs--this was obviously true ofmilitary 
assistance, but it was also true of flows intended for development purposes. On the other hand, there was also a 
strong sentiment in developed countries that resource transfers from rich countries to poor countries were a moral 
obligation. The combination of these two influences led to high and increasing levels of aid flows. 
In the last decade, the cold war rationale has obviously disappeared. At the same time, however, "aid 
fatigue" has gripped the other major rationale for foreign aid, as the result ofbudgetary pressures in donor 
countries but also, equally importantly, as the result of considerable scepticism about the efficacy of foreign aid in 
actually helping poor countries, and in particular the poor in these countries. This scepticism is unusual in that it is 
to be found both on the political right and on the political left. On the right, there has been a revival of old 
arguments (e.g. Bauer and Yamey, 1981) that foreign aid, since it consists of flows to governments from 
governments, simply serves to increase the size of a bloated and inefficient public sector; an argument which has 
gained strength as private capital flows have vastly outstripped public flows in the aggregate. On the left, there 
have been similar concerns about flows going to corrupt elites in the South and in the North, about the use of 
flows to leverage market oriented development strategies, and a preference for channelling flows through the 
newly resurgent civil society in developing countries (e.g. Oxfam, 1995) 
The analytical literature on the efficacy of aid in achieving its stated objectives has provided further grist 
to this mill. It seems clear that the "middle ground" has shifted in the last decade, from the relatively positive 
assessments of Cassen (1987) and Ridell (1987) to the scepticism evident in Boone (1996) or Burnside and Dollar 
(1997). The latter paper, in particular, is illustrative of the point at which the current debate fmds itself. The paper 
concludes that there is, in general, no correlation between aid flows and development as measured by growth in 
per capita GNP (similar results hold in the literature for other indicators such as infant mortality rates). Further 
detailed econometric analysis reveals that this is the result of a combination of forces. While aid does indeed 
increase growth rates when it flows into good policy environments, it typically does not flow into such 
environments and does not induce such environments to emerge. While there are variations between different 
types of aid donors, this is a devastating critique in view of the fact that, at least since the 1980s, the international 
community is meant to have applied conditionality on aid flows (examples of recent theoretical analyses of 
conditionality are Coate and Morris, 1996, and Svensson, 1997b). It also questions somewhat the left leaning 
critique that the reason why aid has failed is that it is directed towards the wrong model of development (so if only 
the model was right, then conditional aid would help development)--but what these recent results seem to suggest 
is that aid cannot leverage policy change domestically. This has in turn led to the discussion and literature on 
"ownership", and then on to how this is to be identified and monitored (see Gwin and Nelson, 1997). 
It is perhaps not surprising that at the end of this exhausting analytical and policy debate on the efficacy 
of conventional aid, some in the policy and in the analytical realm have turned to the newly emerging area of 
international public goods--almost in relief, one feels! There is of course no question that the rapidly globalizing 
world has thrown up major problems of cross border and global externalities, and highlighted others. As Cassen 
(1997) notes: "At any conference to consider the foreign policy agenda of the future, the list of key issues would 
include environment, population, migration and refugees, drugs and crime, and disease control--these are all 
factors in developing countries which can impact on industrial countries." This quote, and the sentiments in it, 
characterise the emergence of a newly articulated rationale for foreign aid, which is closer to the security than to 
the solidarity agenda. It rests much more on the direct spillovers of the lack of development in poor countries, on 
to the well being of those in rich countries. However, there is also a strand in this literature, which recognises that 
attempts to deal with cross border externalities may well have implicit transfers involved. As Schelling (1997) 
notes: "Any action [in rich countries] to combat global warming will be, intended or not, a foreign aid program", ­
and he goes on to make the intriguing suggestion that, in fact, it might be more efficient for the US to undertake 
reduction of global warming gases and allow Bangladesh, say, a higher emission level, rather than making 
fmancial transfers in the old fashioned mode. Similarly, Jamison et.al. (1997) argue that: "Much of [health] aid 
should be redirected away from service delivery and toward activities that require international collective action, 
such as research and development and control of global health risks." 
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Through an interesting dynamic, therefore, we fmd ourselves at the intersection of two literatures--that 
on conventional foreign aid, and that on global externalities and public goods. Could international public goods 
and cross border spillovers provide a revived rationale for old fashioned transfers intended to spur development in 
poor countries? When faced with the choice of making transfer or contributing to an international public good, 
what should a donor country do, even if its objectives were governed by self interest rather than solidarity? And 
what happens to the many issues (like conditionality and ownership) in old fashioned solidarity driven aid, so 
exhaustively and exhaustingly debated over the last twenty years or more, in this new world of international 
public goods? The objective of this paper is to begin the discussion of these questions, which seem to us to have 
been neglected in the rush to embrace international public goods as a new rationale for maintaining international 
development cooperation and even traditional aid flows. Section 2 sets out a simple model of interaction between 
two countries which share a common public good, and poses the problem of the richer "donor" country deciding 
between making a transfer or contributing to a public good, while being concerned only about the impact of 
outcomes on its own well being. Section 3 carries out an analysis of the problem with different specifications of 
the public good. Section 4 concludes the paper with a discussion of the implications and of areas for further 
research. 
..
 
.... 
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2. The Basic Model and the Neutrality Result 
In order to think systematically about the interaction between international public goods and 
conventional aid transfers, in light of the literature on donor-recipient interactions (e.g. Svensson, 1997a, b) and 
the literature on contributions to public goods (e.g. Comes and Sandler, 1996), the simplest model will need the 
following components: two agents with differing endowments; the possibilities of direct transfers from one (the 
richer, say the donor) to the other (the poorer, say the recipient); a public good formed out of contributions of the 
two parties but which both parties enjoy; and a set up where the donor is the "Stackelberg leader" and the decision 
on transfers versus contribution to the international public good is made to maximise the donor's objective 
function, taking into account the recipient's reaction function. In fact, the literature on private contributions to 
public goods provides us with a model which comes very close to the above specification, except that instead of a 
Stackelberg leader-follower set up a Nash equilibrium between the two players is used as the main tool of 
analysis. We will start with a brief statement of the Nash equilibrium framework. This will allow us to introduce 
notation and will also serve as a benchmark for the more appropriate Stacke1berg formulation. 
In the basic Nash model, two goods enter each agent's utility function. One is a private good and the 
other is an international public good. Given their incomes, countries playa noncooperative game in contributions 
towards a single international public good - in other words a good whose consumption is non-excludable and non­
rival. This is a seemingly natural way to model the interaction between the donor and the recipient. It allows for 
an analysis of the effect of an income transfer from one agent to another, and it captures the essence of the 
international public goods problem. Each agent optimises his or her objective function taken other agents' 
strategies as given. Contributions to the public good are made simultaneously by each country. The Nash 
equilibrium is then characterised by the intersection of the best response functions of each player. For the sake of 
clarity, analysis will be restricted to the case where there is one "donor" and one "recipient". Without loss of 
generality, suppose hereafter that agent 1 is the donor and agent 2 is the recipient. The two-player game can be 
described as follows: 
Game 1: Simultaneous contributions to an international public good. 
Definition: A game PI in voluntary, simultaneous contributions to a public good consists of a set of players
 
(I), strategies (gi' Vie I) and payoffs (Ui, Vie I) such that:
 
ieI={l,2}
 
gi e91+
 
Ui = max Uj(Xj, G)
 
s.t. Xi + G = Wj + g-i
 
Xi ~O
 
where: 
1 or 2 
gi government i's contribution to the international public good 
Xi government i' s consumption of a private good 
Wi government i's wealth 
Uj government i's value function 
G g, + g2 = the public good, enjoyed by both parties 
g.j G - gi 
Assumption 1: Utility is continuous, increasing in both arguments and strictly concave. 
-
Denote agent i's demand function for the public good by f;(m), where m = g-i + Wj is i's full income. 
Assumption 2: 1 0 < f;'(m) < 1 
I This assumption simply requires that both the private and the public goods be normal goods and follows 
Andreoni (1988) and Bergstrom et al. (1986). 
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Definition: A Nash equilibrium (NE) of PI is a vector (glo g2) such that for i = 1,2 (gj*, Xi*) solves 
Max Uj(xj, gi +g.i*) 
Xi, gj 
s.t. Xi + gj = Wj 
A key assumption is made in the specification that the public good is simply the sum of the two 
contributions. As will be seen, this additive formulation drives many of the basic results, and departures from 
additivity change the results considerably. 
Let us, for the purpose of PI, restrict our attention to the case where both governments contribute a positive 
amount to the public good in equilibrium, i.e. the NE is an interior one.2Within this framework, foreign aid might 
be conceptualised, as has been done by Sandler (1997) and others, as a transfer of!!.w from government 1 (the 
donor) to government 2. Consider the following comparative statics exercise. Suppose we are originally at an 
interior NE. Now, suppose a "world government" mandates the donor to make a transfer!!.w < gl* to the 
recipient. After the redistribution, it can be shown that there is a new NE in which both the recipient and the 
donor change their contributions to the public good by precisely the same amount by which their wealth has 
changed. Consumption ofboth the public and private goods, and hence indirect utilities, are therefore unaltered in 
the new NE. This is the so-called "neutrality theorem".3 What it means for our purposes is that aid in the form of 
a wealth transfer from donor to recipient has no effect on international public goods provision, or donor and 
recipient well being. Furthermore, the recipient views any increase in the donor's contribution towards the public 
good say !!.g! as identical to a wealth transfer of!!.w = !!.g!. There is a second sort of neutrality result here, in that 
agents are indifferent between aid in the form of public good contributions and aid in the form of transfers. 
The Nash framework is a useful means of conceptualising how the presence of an international public 
good alters the case for conventional resource transfers. However, the Nash approach, standard in the literature on 
public goods, is problematic in our present context for at least two reasons. First, in the foreign aid arena, it is 
natural to think of the "donor" as a "leader". The notion ofa world government which "orders" a transfer from 
donor to recipient, thereby rationalising the Nash comparative static exercise, does not sit well with the aid 
literature, and indeed almost all of the theoretical literature on conditionality and so on is in the Stackleberg 
leader-follower framework. Second and related, it was argued earlier that conventional resource transfers and 
public good contributions could be regarded as dual instruments. Therefore, they should ostensibly be considered 
simultaneously as part of a coherent strategy ifwe are to be capable of addressing the question of balance between 
contributions and direct transfers. These features can better be captured in a Stackleberg leadership game in 
which the recipient plays the best response to the donor's transfer and contribution level, and the donor chooses 
transfer and contribution levels that maximise his own welfare, taking into account the recipient's reaction 
function.4 The Stackleberg game in contributions may be modelled as follows. 
Game 2: Stackleberg ­ donor is the leader and recipient is the follower 
P2 = (I, {gi, Ui}; ~ d where: 
The recipient (follower) solves: 
Max U2(X2, gl +g2 ) 
X2, g2 
s.t. X2 + g2 = W2 
X2, g2 ~ 0 .. 
... 
2The literature also considers comer solutions (see for instance, Comes and Sandler, 1996 and Bergstrom et al., 
1986). These will be mentioned later but not be considered in detail in the Nash framework. 
3See Wan (1983) and Bergstrom et. al. (1986) 
4 See for example Pedersen (1996) who models foreign aid as a Stackelberg game. 
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Denote the recipient's reaction function by: 
Then, the donor (leader) solves: 
Max UI(Xi> gl + g2(gl) ) 
Xi> gl 
s.t. XI + gl =w(
 
Xi> gl ~ 0
 
Definition: A Stackleberg equilibrium (SE) ofP2 is a contribution gl and a reaction function g2(.) such that 
(gl*, XI*) solves the donor's problem and (g2(gl*), X2*) solves the recipient's problem. 
We have argued that P2 is a more appropriate formulation for foreign aid than PI. But formulating the 
problem in this manner does not get rid of the neutrality outcome. Provided that the same conditions mentioned in 
the NE neutrality theorem are satisfied, the SE is also characterised by neutrality following an aid transfer. s In 
particular, starting from an interior SE to P26: (i) a comparative static redistribution of income from 1 to 2 will 
leave public goods provision as well as welfare unaltered and (ii) agents will be indifferent between aid in the 
form of increased public goods contributions and direct income transfers. In particular, the donor will not care, in 
his own interests, whether he gives "conventional" aid or contributes to international efforts to mitigate cross­
border externalities. 
The neutrality result is a sobering one for those who would advocate a transition from conventional aid to 
international public goods contributions, or those who would strengthen the case for conventional aid in the name 
of cross border spillovers. It says that the two are perfect substitutes. Clearly, therefore, we must explore 
deviations from this benchmark if we are to obtain interesting insights into the relationships between conventional 
aid and contributions to international public goods. The next section takes up this story. 
3. Types of International Public Goods and the case for Foreign Aid 
As noted above, the neutrality result renders moot the choice between conventional aid and contributions 
to international public goods. However, as is well known from the public goods literature (see Comes and 
Sandler, 1996) neutrality can be overturned when the technology for the public good is not simply an additive 
one.; Following the literature, we will consider three special cases. The first case considers outcomes when there 
are differing efficiencies in the production of the public good. An example would be pollution abatement - it may 
be cheaper for country 1 to "produce clean air" than it is for country 2. This can be captured in the simplest 
possible manner by supposing that the total public goods provision is still G = gl + g2, but that each country's 
budget constraint is of the form: Xj + 7t~i = Wj, where 7tj '# 7tj. In particular, 7tj < 7tj means that country i produces 
the public good more efficiently than country j. The second case is a "min" technology, where G =min { gi> g2}' 
This relates directly to Hirshleifer's (1983) notion ofa "weakest link" technology in public goods provision, with 
a good example in the international public goods arena being infectious disease control. The third case is a 
"max"(or "best-shot") technology, where G = max{ gi> g2}. This type of view would be pertinent to high-tech 
R&D (with the obvious caveat that the R&D in question is in fact a public good).8 
Non-neutrality results in the Nash game for altemative public goods production technologies have been 
documented elsewhere, most notably in Comes and Sandler (1996) and in Sandler (1997). We summarise 
simplified versions for the three cases mentioned above here - formal statements of the propositions as well as 
proofs can be found in Appendix I. (i) When two countries produce a public good with an additive technology 
(e.g. clean air) with differing efficiencies, non-neutrality results. Furthermore, a transfer from 1 to 2 increases 
(decreases) public goods provision and indirect utility of the donor and recipient if and only if the recipient ­
... 
S For a proof see Bruce (1990) or Sandler (1992) 
6 And provided the conditions from the Nash neutrality result are also satisfied. 
; Even a technology of the formj{kgj) generates the neutrality result. 
8Note that in the "max" and "min" technology cases, assumption 2 must be modified slightly to 0 < fj'(wj) < 1. 
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produces clean air more (less) efficiently than the donor. (ii) Suppose agents are identical, differing only in wealth 
levels, where WI> W2' Then, in the case of a weakest-link technology, a transfer from donor to recipient, which 
does not fully equalise incomes increases public goods provision and makes the recipient unambiguously better 
off. It also makes the donor better off provided the increased utility resulting from increased public goods 
provision more than offsets the reduction in utility following the donor's diminished private goods consumption. 
(iii) Suppose agents are identical, differing only in wealth levels, where WI > W2' Then, in the case of a best-shot 
technology, a transfer from donor to recipient, which does not fully equalise incomes reduces public goods 
provision and makes the donor worse off. However, the recipient will be better offprovided the increased utility 
resulting from increased private goods consumption more than offsets the reduction in utility following the 
diminished public goods provision.9 
The fact that in the Nash case we can talk about whether the donor is better off or not following a transfer 
highlights the problem with the Nash approach--why should a donor make a transfer if it makes him worse off? 
We therefore really do have to move to a Stackleberg framework. The Nash excursion turns out to have been 
useful, however, since the results in the Stackleberg case basically follow the Nash intuitions. 
Analogous to the Nash case, non-neutrality arises in the Stackleberg case when the public good 
technology is non-additive or efficiencies vary. As before, we will consider three cases: differing efficiencies, 
weakest-link and best shot technologies, but this time in a Stackelberg framework. The game is a little more 
complex than that described in P2 above because the donor's strategy consists of an income transfer t to agent 2 
(the recipient) as well as his contribution to the international public good. However, in some cases, rather than 
have the donor maximise directly over t, we will deduce the optimal transfer from the best response function of 
the recipient and the indirect utility function of the donor. In the presence of comer solutions in the transfer­
contributions strategy of the donor, this approach simplifies the analysis considerably. The recipient is the 
follower, and his strategy then simply comprises of a contribution to the public good given the donor's transfer 
and contribution level. Here, we summarise the results in three propositions and briefly outline the intuition 
behind the results. Proofs of these propositions are available in Appendix II. 
Differing efficiencies (tr] ;r tr:), trj E (0, Ij, G = g] + g2 
Proposition I: In a Stackleberg game with differing efficiencies any transfer (t < gl*) from agent 1 to agent 2 
will be characterised by non-neutrality. Furthermore, faced with a choice between income transfers and 
contributions towards the public good, the donor will set t = 0 when 7t2 > 7th and gl = 0 when 7t2 < 7t\. 
Thus, when the donor and the recipient produce the public good with differing efficiencies, a comer 
solution in "transfers" will result. More specifically, the basic intuition is that if the donor is more efficient, then 
he should set direct transfers equal to zero and concentrate solely on public goods provision as a means of 
enhancing welfare. Inasmuch as the recipient directly benefits from the public good, such contributions on the 
part of the donor may be regarded as a more efficient form of foreign aid, thereby echoing the sentiment expressed 
by Schelling (1997). 
Weakest link G = min{g] ,g2} 
Proposition 2: In a Stackleberg framework with identical preferences, characterised by a weakest link 
technology, there are conditions under which there exists a new equilibrium with positive transfers and increased 
public goods provision which pareto dominates the pre-transfer equilibrium. 
Thus when the technology is of the weakest-link variety, the donor will want to use a combination of 
direct resource transfers and contributions to the public good. The reasons for this should be quite intuitive. If the 
public good is a normal good, then contributions to the good increase with income. The "min" technology means 
...
that in order to ensure a given level of contributions, both countries must contribute towards public goods 
provision. Therefore, if the donor wishes to attain a given level of provision, he must encourage the recipient to 
contribute via income transfers to him, and must himself make contributions - complementarity of contributions is 
what drives this result. 
9 For proofs of these propositions see Appendix. 
7 
Best-shot: G = max{g] ,g2} 
Proposition 3: In a Stackleberg framework with a best-shot technology and identical agents, the SE will be 
characterised by zero direct income transfers. 
The outcome here is no different than that in the NE. It is clear that with a "max" technology, the donor 
is better off making no direct income transfer to the recipient, but rather, devoting his resources to public goods 
investments. Given the technology, this result should be relatively intuitive. Even with identical preferences, the 
degree of difference in income levels between donor and recipient typically implies that public goods provision is 
likely to be determined by donor rather than recipient contributions, even when some income transfer is made. 
The donor therefore has no reason to believe that the recipient will devote any direct income transfers towards 
public goods contributions, and therefore has no self-interest in making such transfers. 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
To those who might have thought that cross border externalities and international public goods would lead to 
a significant strengthening of the argument for conventional aid, not by relying on solidarity but by appealing to 
the self interest of the donor, the results of this paper are only half comforting. It turns out that for international 
public goods to come to the rescue of conventional aid through this channel, one of two situations must hold: (i) 
the public good must be an additive combination of the two contributions, and the recipient country must be more 
efficient at producing the public good than the donor country; or (ii) the total public good must be determined to a 
large extent by the lower of the two contributions. If, on the other hand, (i) the public good is additive in 
individual contributions but the donor country is more efficient in producing it, or (ii) the total public good is 
determined by the larger of the two contributions, then it is in the donor's interest to minimise the conventional 
transfer. These cases highlight the fact that the international public goods argument for conventional aid is more 
complex than meets the eye. Depending on the nature of the public good, a variety of outcomes are possible. 
It is worth stressing the importance of setting out exactly the nature of the public good. Let us start with 
fundamental genomic research. This has the characteristics of a max technology, and there is an argument for 
richer countries to undertake this research and then make this freely available to poorer countries. But three issues 
arise. First, will the research be specific to the needs ofpoorer countries? Second, will the results indeed be made 
available freely to poorer countries? Third, even if they are, does the poorer country have the capacity to use 
them? These questions take us deeper into the nature of the good at hand. The fact that different types of research 
(on tropical versus temperate agriculture, for example) affect rich and poor countries differently caution us against 
lumping things together into a single ''public goods" category. The second question reminds us that the publicness 
or otherwise of a good is technologically as well as socially and politically determined--privately conducted 
research into tropical crops, with private patents for seeds etc., is not what we mean by the "max technology" 
specification. The third question reminds us also to think about the whole process before specifying the public 
good. 
Take infectious diseases as another example. The development of vaccines, and fundamental research 
into the nature and evolution of such diseases, is probably a max technology and, according to our analysis, the 
donor would be well advised to conduct such research himself and then make the results freely available to the 
recipient. But implementation of an immunisation program is probably a min technology--no matter how well 
developed the program is in the donor country, ultimately it will be the level of immunisation in the recipient 
country which will determine the global level of infection. The focus therefore should be on improving the 
recipient's capacity and willingness to implement an immunisation program. 
Now consider a class of public goods that seem to satisfy the additive technology characterisation--clean 
air, or its converse the public bad, green house gases. Here, whoever reduces their emission, the whole world 
benefits. Is it better for the US to undertake the reduction, at some cost to its income level, or to give Bangladesh 
foreign aid and rely on the latter to cut its emissions as it gets wealthier? The answer depends on which of the two 
countries can reduce emission at least cost per unit reduction. This is an empirical question, but if it turns out that 
the US is more efficient, it would be rational for the US to seek to achieve emission reductions not through 
making Bangladesh richer and then relying indirectly on Bangladesh's choice to use some of this increase wealth 
-
... 
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to get cleaner air, but by directly reducing its (the US's) own emissions. But if the issue is bio-diversity, and the 
focus is on the bio-diversity present in the Amazon basin, say, then almost by defmition the US is less efficient in 
preserving this than Brazil--the US, in its own interests, will have to rely on giving Brazil the resources with 
which to preserve bio-diversity in the Amazon. 
Thus the presence of international public goods does not necessarily strengthen the case for conventional 
aid across the board. However, it should also be clear from the above that the presence of international public 
goods by no means eliminates the need to worry about the "conventional" problems of "conventional" aid, since 
it is really only in those areas where implementation is not needed in the recipient country that the donor country 
can go it alone. In the min technology, certainly, even optimally the donor will wish to make transfers as well as 
contribute itself to the public good. The efficiency of these transfers then becomes a concern of the donor, and we 
are back in to the depths of the literature on conditionality. For example, the way that transfers have been 
modelled here assumes full fungibility of resources. Clearly, the donor could get a bigger bang for its buck by 
trying to tie the transfers to expenditures on infectious disease control. But in order to do this there needs to be an 
effective contracting system with sanctions for non-compliance. The literature on conditionality has pointed, for 
example, to the "Samaritan's Dilemrna"l0 problem ofa donor who cares about the well being of the recipient, 
hence the inability to implement contracted sanctions, and the inefficiency of the time inconsistency which results. 
These issues are not avoided, indeed they are perhaps sharpened, even when the donor only cares about 
consequences for himself. At the same time, when current efficiency differences in public goods production 
dictate that the donor specializes in contributing to the public good rather than making transfers, there is still the 
question, not modelled in this paper, of whether it is better to try and improve the efficiency of public good 
production in the recipient country--but this takes us right back to implementation issues in the recipient country. 
Thus the basic conclusion of this paper is to insert a note of caution into the current excitement around 
international public goods as a new rationale for aid. International public goods certainly provide a rationale for 
international co-operation based on self interest, but only in certain circumstances do they provide a rationale for 
donors to continue conventional transfers based on self interest. At the same time, in the actual implementation of 
many public goods interventions, the old issues of conditionality, fungibility, monitoring. sanctions, etc. are ever 
present. In order to investigate these issues, further research will have to develop richer models which incorporate 
(i) a combination of altruistic and self interested motives in making transfers, (ii) choices between contributing to 
different types ofpublic goods, (iii) contractual agreements on the transfers and on the public goods contributions, 
and enforcement mechanisms. This will allow us, among other things, to address the question of whether, even 
when there is altruism involved, it is better for the donor country to express it through contributions to the types of 
public goods which do not lead it into the tangle of conditionality--essentially, by supplying public goods which it 
can produce and then make freely available. 
-

.... 
10 See Buchanan (1975) and Coate (1995). 
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APPENDIX I: Nash Propositions and Proofs 
Case 1: Differing efficiencies (ttl ~ ttJJ - G = g I + g2 
Proposition A1: When two countries produce a public good with an additive technology with differing 
efficiencies, non-neutrality results. Furthermore, a transfer (t) from 1 to 2 increases (decreases) public goods 
provision and indirect utility of the donor and recipient if and only if the recipient produces clean air more (less) 
efficiently than the donor. 
Proof 
Neutrality implies that public goods provision and indirect utilities will be unaltered following the transfer. By the 
strict convexity of preferences, this can only be the case ifprivate goods consumption is also unaltered. Consider 
the budget constraint of agents 1 and 2. They are, respectively: 
XI + 7[lgl = WI - t (1) 
X2 + 7[2g2 = W2 + t (2) 
(1) => in order to keep XI constant, the donor has to reduce his contribution by tl7[I' 
(2) => in order to keep X2 constant, the donor has to increase her contribution by tl7[2' 
Neutrality requires that dg 1 + dg2 = O. But differing efficiencies => tl7[1 + tl7[2 ¢ O. This contradiction completes 
the fIrst part of the proof. 
Following G 1, denote agent 1 and agent 2's demand functions for aggregate public goods by fl(m) and f2(m) 
respectively, where m denotes each agent's full income. In any NE following the transfers, we know that the 
following equality must hold: 
Then, the total supply of the public good will increase (G'>G·) following the transfer iff: 
and (3) 
(4)
 
where "primes" denote the NE contributions following the transfer and "stars" denote pre-transfer contributions. 
Assumption 2 means that conditions (3) and (4) can be satisfIed if and only if: 
and (5) 
(6)
 
For the "only if' part of the proposition, we have to show 7[2 > 7[1 implies that G'<G· and UI' < UI·. Suppose 7[2 > 
7[1. Then, for fIxed x = (XI, X2) = (XI·, X2·) it is easy to see that conditions (5) and (6) are not feasible. This 
implies that G'<G·. Furthermore, since utility is increasing in both goods and Xis unchanged, it must also be the 
case that UI' < UI·. 
-
For the "if' portion of the proposition, we must show that 7[2 < 7[\ implies that G'>G· and u\' > UI·. Again, from 
,"' 
the budget constraint, keeping XfIxed at the pre-transfer NE level (XI·, X2·), 7[2 < 7[\ implies that conditions (5) 
and (6) are feasible. We know from the proof of neutrality that when 7[2 = 7[h there exists a new equilibrium in 
which each agent reduces his contribution by precisely the amount of the transfer. Here, we know that agent 1 will 
reduce his contribution by at least tl7[\ and agent 2 will increase his contribution by at least tl7[h in order to 
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compensate for agent 1's reduction. However, 7t2 < 7t1 means that agent 2's income gain outweighs agent 1's 
income loss. Assumption 2 then guarantees that conditions (5) and (6) will hold. This in turn implies that G'>G"'. 
We conducted this exercise holding x fIxed at x"', so it must also be the case that UI' > Uj "'. # 
Case 2: Weakest link - G = min{g} ,g2} 
Proposition A2: Suppose agents are identical, differing only in wealth levels, where WI> W2' Then, in the case of 
a weakest-link technology, a transfer from donor to recipient, which does not fully equalise incomes increases­
public goods provision and makes the recipient unambiguously better off. It also makes the donor better off 
provided the increased utility resulting from increased public goods provision more than offsets the reduction in 
utility following the donor's diminished private goods consumption 
Proof 
Since utility is strictly increasing in wealth, the recipient is obviously made better ofby any positive wealth 
transfer. To see the effect of the transfer on public goods provision, notice fIrst that with identical preferences and 
WI > W2, the NE will be determined by the recipient's demand for the public good: G '" = fiw2)' Clearly, if WI - W2 
> t, i.e. the transfer is non-equalising, it will continue to be the case that the recipient's demand function for the 
public good will determine the aggregate level of public goods provision. So, G' = fiw2 + t). By assumption 2, 
fiw2 + t) > fiw2) for t > O. 
To see what happens to the donor's welfare following a positive transfer notice that the donor's best response will 
simply be to match agent 2 's contributions unit for unit. Following the transfer, donor's value function following 
the may be denoted: 
Taking the derivative of this function with respect to transfers we see that the donor's utility will increase 
following a positive transfer provided: 
The donor will be strictly worse off when this inequality is reversed.# 
Case 3: Best-shot - G = max{g} ,g2} 
Proposition A3: Suppose agents are identical, differing only in wealth levels, where WI> W2' Then, in the case 
of a best-shot technology, a transfer from donor to recipient, which does not fully equalise incomes reduces public 
goods provision and makes the donor worse off. However, the recipient will be better off provided the increased 
utility resulting from increased private goods consumption more than offsets the reduction in utility following the 
diminished public goods provision. 
Proof 
When preferences are identical and WJ - W2, the NE will be characterised with agent 2 contributing nothing 
towards the public good and the agent contributing a positive amount, i.e.: 
When t < WJ - W2, G' = fl(wl - t). From assumption 2, G' < G"'. Clearly, the donor is made strictly worse off by 
such a transaction since (XI', G') < (XI "', G"'). The recipient's indirect utility following the transfer will be: 
,..,. 
-
Taking the derivative of this function with respect to t reveals that the recipient will be better off following the 
transfer provided: 
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[8U2 (W2 + t, fl(wl - t»/8 X2] / [8U2 (W2 + t, f,(wl - t»/8 G] > f l '(WI - t) 
The recipient will be strictly worse off when this inequality is reversed. # 
-
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APPENDIX D: Proofs of Stackleberg Propositions 
ProofofProposition J: Differing efficiencies 
Assume:
 
(7t] 'f. 7t2)' (7tj E (0, 1)), G = gl + g2
 
Denote agent 2's reaction function in the Stackleberg game by G = f((w2 + t)/7t2 + gj). Then agent l's (the
 
leader's) problem is the following:
 
Max UI(Xh f((W2 + t)/7t2+ gt))
 
Xl,gl
 
s.t.	 X)/7tl + gl = (WI - t)/7t 1
 
Xh gl;:::O
 
Let "stars" denote pre-transfer SE levels and "primes" denote post-transfer SE levels. 
Neutrality requires that G' = G*, i.e. that aggregate public goods provision remain unaltered following the 
transfer, and that consumption of the private goods remain unaltered (i.e. that individuals' indirect utilities are 
unaltered). The fIrst of these conditions implies that: 
By the strict convexity of preferences, this can only hold if: 
Note however, differing efficiencies implies that tl7t2 'f. tl7tI' Therefore, when the above equality holds, the donor 
is strictly better off when 7t2 < 7t] and strictly worse off when 7t2 > 7t 1. This contradiction completes the proof of 
non-neutrality . 
For the second half of the proposition, consider the utility of the donor, keeping G fIxed at G*. 
Before the transfer the donor's indirect utility is: 
Following the transfer, it is: 
Suppose 7t2 > 7tj. Then it should be clear from the expression above that a utility-maximising donor will wish to 
set t=0. Suppose, alternatively, that 7t2 < 7t). Then, analogously, the donor should set gl=O. # 
ProofofProposition 2: Weakest link G = min{g] ,g2}
 
Suppose agents 1 and 2 have identical preferences and differ only in wealth levels, where WI> W2' Then, clearly:
 
-

..,.Now, suppose there was a transfer from 1 to 2 which was not perfectly equalising, i.e. WI - W2 > t. Then, clearly: 
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Clearly, agent 2 is better off folJowing a transfer and by assumption 2, G' > G"'.
 
As before, denote agent 2's demand for the public good by f(w2 + t). Then, agent 1's problem is the folJowing:
 
Max Ul(WI - t - f(w2 + t), f(w2 + t))
 
t~ 0 
In order to see when it would be expedient for the donor to make a transfer to the recipient, consider the fIrst order 
condition to the donor's maximisation problem. 
lim -[8 U\(WI - t - f(w2 + t), f(w2 + t))/8 xd[1 + f(W2 + t)] + [8 UI(WI - t - f(w2 + t), f(w2 + t))/8G] [f(W2 + t)] 
t~ 0 
Agent I will therefore fmd it worthwhile making a positive transfer if and only if: 
Therefore, when this condition is satisfIed, both agents are made better offby the transfer.#
 
ProofofProposition 3: Best-shot: G = max{g] ,g2}
 
When agents are identical, differing only in terms of income, we know that in equilibrium g2 = o.
 
Then, agent I's problem becomes: 
Max U(WI - t - gj, gl) 
gj, t 
s.t. gl ~ 0 
t ~ 0 
It is clear that the second constraint wilJ be binding. So, gl wilJ solve the fIrst order condition: 
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